Anglo-American relations and crisis in The Congo by Marsh, Stephen & Culley, Tierney
ARTICLE
Congo, Anglo-American relations and the narrative of
decline: drumming to a different beat�
Steve Marsh and Tia Culley
5Cardiff University, UKAQ1 �AQ2
ABSTRACT
The 1960 Belgian Congo crisis is generally seen as demonstrating
Anglo-American friction and British policy weakness. Macmillan’s
decision to ‘stand aside’ during UN ‘Operation Grandslam’, espe-
10cially, is cited as a policy failure with long-term corrosive effects on
Anglo-American relations. This article recasts this decision as a
shrewd manoeuvre in extremely tight circumstances, balancing
multiple interests and preventing an open breach with
Kennedy’s Congo policy. Moreover, ‘stand aside’ facilitated subse-
15quent Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo, which this arti-
cle demonstrates by examining events beyond December 1962,
where much of the current analysis peters out.
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Scholarship on Anglo-American relations during the Kennedy-Macmillan era paints a
generally positive picture.1 The personal relationship between President and Prime
20Minister was unexpectedly warm and ably assisted by key officials, notably British
Ambassador to Washington David Ormsby-Gore. Both sides were determined to con-
tinue the rebuilding process begun by Eisenhower and Macmillan following the disas-
trous Suez crisis and their cooperation was marked by important initiatives, including
the 1963 Test Ban Treaty. The traditional irritant of the British Empire was seemingly
25eased by Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech and commitment to rapid but responsible
decolonisation.2 And renewed Anglo-American intimacy was evident in the privileged
position accorded to Britain during the Cuban missile crisis and by Kennedy’s decision,
following an emotional appeal by Macmillan in the wake of the cancellation of Skybolt,
to override opposition from within his administration and provide Britain with Polaris.
30Yet, in more recent years a revisionist tone has emerged suggesting limits to the
extent that Kennedy and Macmillan’s personal diplomacy could deliver positive out-
comes, reconcile underlying Anglo-American differences and mask consequences flow-
ing from the growing asymmetry of the special relationship. Revealing of internal
American reconsideration of British relative capabilities and importance was the
35Multilateral Force Concept (MLF). Designed to help resolve tension with NATO over
nuclear control, the MLF potentially positioned Britain as a primarily European power
and questioned the continuation of its independent nuclear deterrent.3 There were
sharp differences too over handling of the Cold War. Bitter American disappointment
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at British trade with Cuba was reciprocated in Macmillan’s sense of betrayal at American
40sales of Hawk missiles to Israel and resentment that US pressure within NATO led to the
organisation’s adoption of the American Sergeant surface-to-surface missile rather than
the British-designed Blue Water system. At their first hastily arranged meeting in
March 1961, Macmillan fought a rearguard action against Kennedy’s pressure for a
British military commitment should the US intervene in Laos. And when civil war
45broke out in the Yemen in 1962, the British refused to support American plans to extend
diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary republican regime, which was known to be
backed by Egyptian President Nasser. More generally, it has been argued that Macmillan
was disillusioned both with American unwillingness to ‘parley at the summit’ with the
Soviets, especially in the aftermath of the disastrous Four Power meeting in Paris in
50May 1960, and with US interpretation of the concept of Anglo-American
interdependence.4
The focus of this article, the Congo crisis, has traditionally been interpreted in the
sense of a crisis in Anglo-American relations. Scholars viewing the Macmillan–Kennedy
years positively tend either to gloss over the crisis or treat it as a friction without
55significant lasting effect. For others, the crisis was symptomatic of diverging Anglo-
American interests and of a wider malaise afflicting the relationship as both sides
adjusted to Britain’s ever-more evident relative decline and its movement towards the
European Economic Community. Some authors have gone as far as to suggest that the
Congo was for Britain ‘little short of a diplomatic disaster’5 and that the rift with America
60had corrosive long-term effects on the wider special relationship.6
This article acknowledges that the 1960s were a period of adjustment in the
special relationship but uses newly declassified materials to challenge conventional
wisdom regarding British policy towards the Congo and its significance for Anglo-
American relations. First, it argues that the British decision to stand aside during
65Operation Grandslam should be seen not as a policy failure but as a reasonably
successful effort to establish a middle ground when confronted by both substantial
policy constraints and a possible open disagreement with Kennedy’s Congo
policy. Second, by looking beyond December 1962, where most studies finish, the
article demonstrates continuing close Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo,
70which in turn suggests that the long-term effects of the crisis on the special relation-
ship were less harmful than sometimes suggested.
An Anglo-American consensus
The speed with which the Belgian government pulled out of the Congo, coupled with a
long history of ‘paternalistic’7 governance, left the Congolese politically and socially
75unprepared for�the challenges of developing a modern independent nation-state. The
region had been awarded to King Leopold II of Belgium as ‘Congo Free State’ at the
1884–85 Berlin Conference. The Belgian government subsequently acquired it in 1908
for approximately 220 million Belgian francs and renamed it Belgium Congo.8 Thereafter
it was administered by a ‘colonial trinity’ comprising the colonial administration, foreign
80business and the Roman Catholic Church.9 The latter provided one of few unifying
institutions in the country and brought some education to its citizens. Nevertheless,
although the Congo had the best literacy rate in the sub-Saharan Africa10 it was not until
2 S. MARSH AND T. CULLEY
the second quarter of the twentieth century that Catholic missions began to offer
secondary education11 and by 1960 there were just two Universities in the Congo: the
85University of Lovanium in Leopoldville and the University of Elisabethville. Thus, when
independence was granted, few native political elite and military officers existed in the
Congo and there was no experience of self-governance or democracy.12
Prior to independence, the first elections exacerbated pre-existing rifts between the
Congo’s over 200 tribal groups. The agreed Federal model of government, with a
90legislature composed of a Chamber of Representatives and a Senate, forced the already
small and inexperienced political elite to divide itself among several different echelons
of government13 and augured ill for independent government. Furthermore, the way in
which the central government was created served to initiate long-term tension within
the political elite. Although the King of Belgium was accorded power to select a
95formateur, who would then appoint a cabinet under legislative approval, he relinquished
this responsibility to the Belgian minister without portfolio in charge of African affairs,
Hans Ganshof van der Meersch. Van der Meersch subsequently selected Joseph
Kasavubu, founder of the Alliance des Bakongo (Aboko) party, as formateur, despite the
leader of the Mouvement National Congolaise (MNC) party, Patrice Lumumba, being
100democratically elected as the Congo’s leader. Once Kasavubu proved unable to form a
Cabinet, however, Lumumba appointed himself as Prime Minister and Kasavubu as the
President.14 Relations between the two leaders were unsurprisingly ‘strained’ and ‘hos-
tile’ even during the independence celebrations on 30 June 1960.15
For some, the manner of Belguim’s withdrawal suggests a neo-colonial policy
105designed to preserve Belgian government and commercial interests following the
Congo’s formal award of independence.16 It is unlikely, however, that these actors
foresaw the speed and severity of the crisis that swiftly ensued. Continuity of colonial
issues after independence, captured in the infamous comment scribbled on a black-
board by army chief General Émile Janssens, that ‘before independence = after inde-
110pendence’, provoked indignation within the Congolese population and resentment
amongst Congolese soldiers towards their Belgian officers.17 On 5 July, Congolese
soldiers at the Thysville barracks, just 90 miles from the capital, mutinied and in a
show of support, workers began to strike, threatening civil and military disorder
throughout the country.18 Rivalries between different ethnic groups in the cities of
115Leopoldville and Luluabourg compounded difficulties in maintaining order and on
9 July, the Belgian military intervened.19 However, it did so without acquiring full
support from either Lumumba or Kasavubu,20 prompting the Congolese leadership to
request that the United Nations (UN) secure the removal of Belgian troops and help
restore order and stability to the country.21
120On 12 July, the crisis deepened when the country’s most prosperous province,
Katanga, declared secession under the leadership of Moïse Tshombé. Although
Tshombé opposed Lumumba’s leadership and used this as the excuse to initiate
Katanga’s secession, the move was driven also by indigenous Katangese elites22 and
by Belgian neo-colonial interests. Katanga was a mineral rich region and dominated
125economically by a Belgian mining company called Union Minière du Haut-Katanga
(UMHK), which supplied 80 per cent of Katanga’s revenues. Belgian colonists, most of
who were tied to the UMHK, were wary of the consequences that the Congo’s
independence might bring. As the Congo was a shareholder with voting powers
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within the UMHK, European companies in the Congo had to operate without the full
130rights that were usually accorded to boards of management.23 This arrangement had
worked well during Belgium’s colonial rule but Lumumba’s left-wing nationalist
leadership posed a significant threat to their continued prosperity.24 Although the
Belgium government officially rejected Tshombé’s request for financial, technical and
military support,25 the UMHK helped to underwrite Katanga’s bid for independence.
135The company not only provided Tshombé with financial support but also organised
the breakaway state, institutionally representing it in Brussels and recruiting a
Belgian scholar to draft Katanga’s new constitution.26 From the perspective of the
Central Congolese Government—and many other African states—Katanga’s secession
marked an effort by Western commercial interests to retain their neo-colonial posi-
140tion and thereby both impede the Congo’s full independence and deny the state a
major source of revenue.
Initial British and American policy positions in the Congo were broadly aligned. Both
countries, in what had been designated the ‘Year of Africa’, feared the consequences
that might flow from either the Congo’s disintegration or its falling under unsympathetic
145African nationalist leadership. The Congo’s size, mineral riches and central African
location would surely attract unwanted Soviet attention, and potential for communist
or non-aligned countries to cause problems within the UN was ever greater as decolo-
nisation denied the US and UK automatic majorities in the General Assembly.27 Also,
Congolese nationalism threatened not only Belgian interests but also the pro-western
150influence of the Catholic Church on account of its close association with the Belgian
state.28 Furthermore, there were early indications of Congolese willingness to seek
Soviet support in order to remove Belgian forces from the region.29 On 13 July, after
Belgian troops occupied the Leopoldville airport, Lumumba and Kasavubu appealed to
Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, to monitor the situation closely lest Soviet intervention
155was necessary to stop western aggression against the Congo.30 These considerations
together produced Anglo-American agreement on two key objectives. First, they needed
to establish in the Congo a stable, united and independent government that was
reasonably friendly with the West. Second, they wanted to prevent the Congo from
becoming an ‘arena of Cold War competition.’ 31 The UN was therefore seen as the best
160means to ensure these objectives and the Operations des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)
was duly established on 14 July 1960.32
Broad Anglo-American alignment did not mean an absence of influential policy
nuances. Perhaps the most important of these flowed from Britain’s status as a colonial
power with considerable African responsibilities being in juxtaposition with traditional
165US anti-colonialism and a newfound American interest in harnessing African indepen-
dence leaderships. These differences were immediately highlighted in negotiation of the
first UN mandate in the Congo. This mandate called on Belgium to withdraw its troops
and authorised the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to take the necessary
steps in consultation with the Congolese government to provide it with UN military and
170technical assistance until ‘the national security forces may be able . . .to meet fully their
tasks.’33 The Eisenhower administration’s default position was to avoid American identi-
fication with European metropolitan policies during the process of African
decolonisation.34 This meant that the administration favoured reliance on the UN to
achieve political stability in the Congo and that it consequently voted in favour of the
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175first mandate.35 Prime Minister Macmillan’s position was much more difficult. His Cabinet
was disposed to see the Congo crisis as a private matter of Belgian decolonisation. There
were concerns too, for British economic interests in the Congo and about the implica-
tions of any UN action for British responsibilities elsewhere. In Britain’s view, therefore,
the UN mandate was too critical of Belgium and threatened to set unwanted precedents
180for British African colonies that were also preparing for independence.36 Although
Macmillan publicly supported the ONUC operation, in the UN Britain abstained from
voting for the mandate, alongside China and France.37
Nevertheless, at this point, Britain’s abstention at the UN was a portent of differences
to come rather than an upset to Anglo-American relations. In fact, Lumumba unwittingly
185served to draw UK and US positions closer together than hitherto. On 17 July, he and
Kasavubu delivered an ultimatum to the UN Undersecretary General for Special Political
Affairs, Ralph Bunche, stating that if the UN did not discharge the Belgian military
mission within 72 hours they would be ‘obliged to call upon the Soviet Union to
intervene’.38 The ultimatum was dropped with the passing of the first UN mandate,
190but the damage had been done. The American Embassy in Leopoldville concluded that
Kasavubu was ‘under [Lumumba’s] thumb’ and was not himself a threat to US
interests.39 Lumumba, though, was perceived differently. US Chief of Station in the
Congo, Larry Devlin, recalls that although there was no reason to believe Lumumba
was a Soviet agent or even a communist, he was still ‘too close to the Soviet Union and
195its allies for comfort’.40 On 21 July, the US National Security Council (NSC) went further,
characterising Lumumba as a ‘Castro or worse’.41 Fear of another revolutionary leader,
this time in the Congo, now inclined the Eisenhower administration to hedge its bets
rather than to simply ride traditional US anti-colonialism.
The ideal solution remained a united Congo under pro-western leadership, which
200was still the publicly maintained line, but privately this was not considered possible
under Lumumba. Lumumba, therefore, became the focal point of Eisenhower’s
Congolese policy based on the premise that ‘there was no Katanga problem between
Tshombé and Kasavubu. . .only with Lumumba’.42 Meantime, it was essential that
Katanga remain a viable independent unit within the western orbit. This did not
205necessarily equate, as has been suggested, to the Eisenhower administration still
having ‘an eye on following its European allies.’43 US records make clear the admin-
istration’s determination to prevent a militant Katanga leadership as well as to combat
Lumumba,44 the underlying rationale being twofold. First, Katanga might provide a
solution to the Congo crisis. Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Maurice Stans and
210Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon speculated in August 1960 whether
Tshombé’s efforts to pick up other areas of the Congo might be quietly supported
as a step towards reorganising the country in a loose confederation. Moreover, to do
so at this stage was less politically dangerous to the US given that Belgian troop
withdrawals were diminishing the impression of Tshombé as a puppet of colonial
215interests. Second, Katanga might provide a bulwark in the event that an independent
Congo disintegrated or fell under Soviet influence. As Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), Allen Dulles, advised the NSC in August 1960, if the assets
of Katanga could be retained, then the economy of the Congo could be throttled and
the Soviets left with a very expensive and difficult task in maintaining the rest of the
220Congo as a viable asset.45
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Evolving Anglo-American discord
President John F Kennedy assumed office in January 1961 with the Congo crisis
threatening both America’s political reputation and the credibility of the UN in Africa.
His predecessor’s policy had disappointed Afro-Asian nationalists, resulting both in
225accusations that the US was supporting Western colonial interests and in threats by
countries including Guinea, UAR, Morocco and Indonesia to withdraw their military
contributions from the UN mission.46 This was not an inconsequential risk for the US
given that 82.4% of ONUC military forces came from Afro-Asian states and that collec-
tively the most important contributing states—India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia and
230Ghana—provided 61.2% of total ONUC forces.47 In addition, the constitutional crisis
that had developed in the Congo following a failed attempt in September 1960 by
Kasavubu to remove Lumumba, continued. Of particular concern was Antoine Gizenga,
President of the Parti Solidaire African, a left-wing political party that enjoyed strong
support among the rural regions in Kwango and Kwilu and which had formed part of the
235inaugural post-independence coalition. On 15 December 1960, US intelligence reported
that Gizenga had proclaimed himself to represent the lawful government of the Congo
and that this statement was probably designed to encourage diplomatic recognition
and material aid from the Soviet Union and Afro-Asian bloc.48 On 7 January, pro-
Lumumba Afro-Asian states gathered at the Casablanca conference and duly called for
240the transfer of Casablanca troops from the ONUC to Gizenga.49 Gizenga also sent
requests to Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht, leader of the German Democratic
Republic, for military aid with which he initiated attacks on Northern Katanga,50 forcing
Tshombé to rely increasingly on open Belgian assistance to maintain the secession.51
Thus, when in January 1961 Lumumba was assassinated by Belgian and Congolese
245military police,52 his death did not offer the automatic solution to the Katangese
secession for which Eisenhower had hoped.53
In response, the Kennedy administration evolved a ‘New’ policy centred upon
three objectives. The first called for a strengthened UN mandate which would give
it the authority to bring under control all principal military elements in the Congo
250and thereby neutralise the role of Congolese forces in the politics of the country.
Under the new mandate, the UN would be expected to increase its efforts to prevent
all outside military assistance from entering the Congo. Second, with the Afro-Asians
at the forefront, the UN should have a greater administrative role in the Congo. The
overarching goal was to reorient the US position such that it would have the support
255of ‘principal segments of opinion in Africa and Asia.’54 Third, there needed to be a
broadly based Congolese government, which meant pressing Kasavubu to increase
his efforts in establishing a middle of the road cabinet government55 and strength-
ened US efforts to sponsor the appointment of a suitable Prime Minister. Following a
flirtation with Joseph Iléo, a senator who had been strongly opposed to Lumumba
260but who proved to be a weak leader, this meant supporting Cyrille Adoula, who was
aligned with a pro-Western Binza group and whom US Chief of Station in the Congo,
Larry Devlin, recalls as having assisted US attempts in early September 1960 to
remove Lumumba via a no-confidence vote.56
Kennedy’s gradual adherence to Afro-Asian hard-lined policies and progressively
265militarised UN actions after Lumumba’s assassination began to drive a wedge into US-
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UK relations in the Congo. Lumumba’s assassination had angered the Afro-Asian states
and, led by Egyptian President Nasser, they proposed a resolution to the UN Security
Council whereby the ONUC ought to have the right to use force ‘if necessary, in last
resort’ to prevent civil war.57 The passage of this resolution allowed Hammarskjöld to
270approve two ONUC operations in Katanga. The first was Operation Rumpunch, initiated
on 28 August to expel Belgian officers and mercenaries from Katanga.58 When that failed
the second mission was Operation Morthor. Launched on 13 September59 without
consultation with Washington or other Western powers, this too proved to be proble-
matic. Rhodesian political support for Tshombé meant that the Katangese forces were
275provided with military equipment sufficient to surround the UN troops in Jadotville and
bring the UN campaign precariously close to defeat.60 Moreover, Hammarskjöld was
killed on 17 September when his plane crashed en route to ceasefire negotiations with
Tshombé in Ndola.61
Macmillan’s government was deeply concerned about increased ONUC military cap-
280ability, faced substantial domestic and international pressure to prevent the use of UN
military force in Katanga, and was so angered by the ONUC’s impetuous actions that it
considered terminating support for the UN if fighting were not immediately
suspended.62 Evolving US-UK policy differences were evident at the December 1961
Bermuda Summit. Foreign Secretary, Lord Home reiterated the British opinion that the
285UN had exceeded its mandate and had ‘gotten itself in a bad way in [the] Congo.’63 He
also expressed concern at the possible prolongation of UN military involvement and
urged the US towards favouring the use of diplomatic negotiations. The Kennedy
administration publicly reiterated American support for a peaceful solution to the
Katanga secession64 but privately officials favoured a swift solution and were increas-
290ingly frustrated with perceived British apathy in exerting ‘real pressure on Tshombé.65
Moreover, American concern deepened as a result of two developments. First, Adoula,
whose appointment as Prime Minister in August 1961 Secretary of State Dean Rusk had
called a defeat for the Soviets, was losing support.66 Second, Tshombé continued to
equivocate. On 21 December 1961, he and Adoula signed the Kitona Accords,67 which
295recognised the political unity of the Congo. Subsequently, however, Tshombé reneged
upon his commitment, accusing the US Ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion, of
imposing the agreement upon him.68
With the Americans increasingly convinced that diplomatic negotiations alone would
not be enough to resolve the crisis, 69 Under Secretary of State George Ball epitomised
300how Anglo-American thinking began consequently to diverge. In his view, Tshombé
would continue to refuse agreements unless he was ‘deprived of his means to maintain
[his] independent operation’. Ball also believed that the new UN acting Secretary
General, U Thant, should recognise that the Congo was now at a stage where the
‘upgrading of effort’ was both ‘necessary and desirable.’70 On 24 July 1962, Ball’s
305thinking was transposed by the African Bureau of the State Department into a
National Reconciliation Plan. This plan had four incremental phases intended to guar-
antee its timely implementation. If progress were not made in the drafting and approval
of the Congolese constitution (phase one) or in Katanga’s acceptance of it (phase two)
then economic sanctions (phase three) would be invoked against Katanga. Finally, if
310economic sanctions did not work, there would be a threat of military coercion (phase
four) to ensure the plan’s implementation.71 Stages one and two of the plan were given
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White House general approval on 6 August72 and, after discussions with U Thant and the
French, British and Belgian Embassies in Washington, the Plan was revised on 11 August,
the final version becoming the UN reconciliation plan.73 The most significant change
315was the deletion of specific measures in phase four with an understanding that if that
stage were reached the participating governments would consult with each other and
the UN when necessary.74 This was to prove problematic later in that this in-built
ambiguity allowed U Thant to progress military measures against Katanga faster than
the Kennedy administration wished. Meantime, though, Adoula and Tshombé accepted
320the plan under heavy American pressure.75
It was the incremental progression of the reconciliation plan that finally pushed the
Macmillan government and Kennedy administration into opposing camps. By
September 1962, Tshombé and Adoula had not reached any substantial agreement
concerning reconciliation and the Katangese secession remained. On 25 September, in
325an attempt to ensure continued UK cooperation with the plan the US Ambassador to the
UN, Adlai Stevenson, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George McGhee,
asked the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, to uphold the third phase of the
reconciliation plan, namely to apply economic sanctions upon Tshombé alongside
Belgium and the US. They argued that the Congo had reached the pinnacle of crisis
330and that failure of the reconciliation plan would lead to both a bankruptcy of the ONUC
and civil war in the Congo. Home demurred, reiterating British objections to sanctions
on the grounds that their failure was likely to be followed by the use of military force.76
These differences were subsequently replayed at the highest diplomatic level at
the Nassau summit in December 1962. Kennedy outlined American concerns that the
335ONUC would collapse; the UN was running out of money and India, the largest
military contributor to the ONUC, would be withdrawing its forces in March 1963.
The best course of action was thus to prove to Tshombé that the UN stood behind
the reconciliation plan, even if that risked military action. Kennedy’s presentation
succeeded only in raising British hackles. At one stage, Lord Home lost his temper
340and asked if the ‘United States Government would tell Adoula to dismiss the
Congolese Parliament and rule by decree. Was the United States going to tell the
world this?. . . "Best idea I have heard in years.”’ Macmillan also suggested sarcasti-
cally that ‘the US should take over the Congo and make Tshombé into some kind of
a Maharajah, with US support.’77 Although the two delegations returned to consider
345the Congo crisis in an improved atmosphere on 21 December, no further progress
was made. Britain subsequently stood aside as the ONUC military operation
‘Grandslam’ began on 28 December 196278 and eventually forced Tshombé to
announce formally the end of the Katangese secession on 14 January 1963.79
Stand aside re-evaluated
350There was no meeting of Anglo-American minds at Nassau about the Congo crisis
but this was not wholly unexpected and the US ultimately got what it wanted. As the
State Department noted before the summit, all they really needed from the UK was
their ‘grudging acquiescence accompanied by silence’.80 For the British, though, the
decision to stand aside and the subsequent forcible reintegration of Katanga into the
355Congo by ONUC forces have encouraged scholars such as Ashton, James and
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O’Malley to conclude that the Congo crisis represented a ‘decisive defeat for the
British government’ and an evident failure to coordinate British and American
policies.81 Yet while differences between Macmillan and Kennedy’s Congo policies
undoubtedly strained Anglo-American relations, it is an overstatement to see stand
360aside as a policy failure. It should be viewed instead as a reasonably successful
attempt at damage limitation when confronted by substantial policy constraints
and disagreement with Kennedy’s Congo policy.
The Macmillan government’s policy was geared throughout the crisis to securing
Katanga’s reintegration without unduly weakening Tshombé’s government. The reason-
365ing behind this was made clear during a September 1961 Cabinet meeting. If Tshombé
were defeated, it would encourage the collapse of Katanga’s administration and, with
Gizenga retaining a seat of legitimate power in the central government, risk surrender-
ing the central government to Soviet influence. Thus, Macmillan believed that the best
policy objective was to convince Tshombé to cooperate with the central government,
370and to achieve this, the UN had to ‘devote themselves to mediation rather than to the
exercise of force’.82
However, while British concern about possible Soviet gains in the Congo and else-
where in Africa was genuine, their strongest representations thereof were tactical, being
aimed at presumed American over-sensitivity to the communist threat. Behind British
375anti-communism lay three interconnected considerations that determined policy and
which became increasingly pressing as events unfolded in the Congo. The first con-
straint was economic. Some 45% of British investment in the Congo was concentrated in
the mineral rich region of Katanga83 and the single most important concern was
Tanganyika Concessions—a London-based holding company that had a 14.5% percent
380shareholding in the UMHK.84 According to Captain Charles Waterhouse, Chairman of the
Tanganyika Concessions and a member of the UMHK’s board of directors, Britain’s
financial interest in the area was ‘of the order of £180 million’. Through letters and
meetings with Foreign Office officials Waterhouse repeatedly emphasised the impor-
tance of ensuring the UMHK’s continued stability and that forced entry into Katanga by
385ONUC forces could jeopardise the investments of many British stakeholders.85
The second consideration was geopolitical and stemmed from Britain’s role as a
colonial power and the Congo’s geographical position. Immediately to the east of the
Congo were Uganda and Tanganyika, and beyond them, Kenya. To the Congo’s south-
eastern border lay the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the outset of the crisis,
390Britain bore responsibility for all of these territories, which meant that political instability
within Katanga threatened to complicate British governance in neighbouring states.
Meantime, South Africa favoured Katanga with cautious diplomatic, economic and
limited military support in order to bolster white minority power, prevent anti-colonial
counter-violence and guard against the Congo becoming a UN precedent for interven-
395tion in South West Africa.86 Northern Rhodesia, though, was of particular concern to the
British given their ongoing attempts to maintain the Central African Federation (CAF),
which linked the protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the white-settler-
dominated colony of Southern Rhodesia.87 As Northern Rhodesia and Katanga shared
‘the copper belt’ border, the security of the UMHK and Tshombé’s continued leadership
400were of great importance to the white-settler leadership of the CAF. The Prime Minister
of the Federation, Sir Roy Welensky, sent regular letters to Macmillan and Lord Home
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specifically arguing this point. In one such letter he informed Home that Tshombé was
‘an implacable enemy of communism’ and could be a ‘very good friend to the West if
only they showed him the slightest support and encouragement.’88 Furthermore, there
405was a danger that UN military intervention might force Welensky and Tshombé into a
military alliance, thereby creating a powerful autonomous copper belt region and
serious complications for Britain’s African responsibilities.89
The final consideration was the political influence of pro-Katanga forces within
domestic British politics, with which Welensky maintained good relations. Prominent
410members of the British Katanga Lobby included former MP Captain Charles Waterhouse;
Lords Alexander, Selbourne and Clitheroe—three Conservative Privy Councillors and
each a member of the Tanganyika Concessions Ltd Board; and the Lord of Salisbury,
founder of the Conservative Monday Club—a group established in 1961 partly in
reaction to Conservative Party decolonisation policy and from which the Katanga
415Lobby also drew support. Influential members of this club included Major Patrick Wall,
John Biggs-Davidson, Paul Williams, Neil McLean and Anthony Fell—the latter founding
the Anglo-Katanga Association in July 1960.90 Furthermore, there were close personal
relations between some members of the Katanga Lobby and members of the govern-
ment. Murphy, for instance, has placed particular emphasis on the importance of
420Waterhouse’s relationship with Foreign Secretary Home in drawing sympathy for
Katanga and in presenting its stability as being a bulwark against communism.91
These policy constraints cumulatively placed the Macmillan government in an awk-
ward position. Though it appeared to have the ability to apply significant pressure on
Tshombé via the use of economic and political contacts in Northern Rhodesia and in the
425UMHK, in reality the government was exceedingly limited in supporting policies that
went beyond securing a peaceful reintegration of Katanga. Anything more risked the
wrath of Conservative backbenchers and possibly the fall of the government. The
seriousness of Macmillan’s problems was demonstrated in late 1961. During Operation
Morthor the ONUC was materially disadvantaged by its inability to call upon aircraft
430capable of responding to air attacks from Katanga. Six British-built Canberra bombers
were consequently acquired from India. Then, in the latter part of October, Macmillan’s
government received a UN request to supply 24,000 pound bombs to fit the planes.92
The British government was immediately trapped between the UN and likely strong
resistance to the request from the Conservative backbenchers in Parliament and from
435within the Cabinet itself. To supply the bombs opened Macmillan’s government up to
attack from the Katanga Lobby but to withhold the bombs would incite allegations of
succumbing to British business interests and incur political blowback in the UN.93 On
7 December, Foreign Office officials agreed to supply the bombs under the condition
that they were only to be used in ‘self defensive action confined to attacking private
440aircraft on the ground or destroying runways.’94 However, this careful compromise was
ruined by UN statements and actions. Sture Linner, the UN Officer in charge of the
Congo, proclaimed in an interview with a Swedish newspaper his intent to smash
Tshombé and his military forces.95 Rumours of ONUC attacks on mines, hospitals and
private houses became reality when Ethiopian ONUC soldiers killed three Red Cross
445workers.96 With an impending foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on
14 December, Macmillan feared that opposition on the Canberra bombs issue would
be enough to topple his government through a vote of no confidence.97 The only
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option was to persuade President Kennedy to arrange an immediate ceasefire in the
area. Fortunately the British Ambassador to the US, David Ormsby-Gore, was successful
450in this appeal. In the Ambassador’s presence, Kennedy telephoned George Ball and
instructed him accordingly: ‘I have got David Gore sitting beside me here, he will explain
what it is the British Government wants done, and I want it done.’98 The ceasefire was
announced by U Thant the following day.99
Kennedy’s action, however, afforded Macmillan only temporary relief. A similar sce-
455nario presented itself once U Thant made the decision on 7 December 1962 to proceed
to the next phase of the UN reconciliation plan.100 With the Canberra bombs issue as an
ominous backdrop, Macmillan baulked at the American request at the Nassau summit to
place economic sanctions on Tshombé. The power of the Katanga Lobby and backbench
opposition threatened the stability of his government. Concomitantly, though, to
460oppose the ONUC mission was also unacceptable. It would provide Tshombé with
additional political leverage before the UN Operation began and make public Anglo-
American disagreement, both of which risked damage to the special relationship.
The British government was reduced to two options. The first of these was to do
nothing. When asked by Secretary of State Dean Rusk what the British proposed to do in
465regards to the UN request to impose economic sanctions, Home ‘wondered whether we
should not have to live with the present situation for some time.’ This did not imply
recognition of Katanga as a sovereign state but did entail leaving the province alone.
Home proposed that the ONUC troops could leave, enabling the UN to convert its
operation into a civilian mission ‘for salving the rest of the Congo.’101 In reality, of
470course, this was a non-option as the Kennedy administration had grown tired of what
Ormsby-Gore termed the ‘ostrich position’102 in reference to the ‘usual’ British pragma-
tism, a ‘resolution to let sleeping dogs lie, not to engage in hypothetical or advance
planning, to procrastinate.’103 With Kennedy under increasing domestic and interna-
tional pressure to end the secession,104 the ‘only possible’ course of action for
475Macmillan’s government was to offer to ‘stand aside.’105
It is thus easy to see why analyses of Britain’s immediate position following Operation
Grandslam have led scholars to claim British policy failure. The manner in which the
ONUC eventually brought about the end of Katanga’s secession—by the use of military
force with only limited damage to the UMHK in the aftermath—made British policy
480concerns appear rather unfounded. Also, Macmillan’s decision to refuse to support
economic sanctions on Tshombé meant that members of Adoula’s government per-
ceived Britain to have largely prioritised Tshombé’s security over achieving Katanga’s
successful reintegration into the Congo.106
However, stand aside was actually a shrewd move in tight circumstances that helped
485ease Anglo-American tension and provided for future cooperation in the Congo. In
September 1962, having realised it was unlikely that Macmillan’s government would
be able to support the UN reconciliation plan, the State Department made a direct
request that the British silence their public opposition to the matter.107 Critical public
statements emanating from Britain strengthened Tshombé’s political campaign and
490placed increasing pressures on a Kennedy administration that was already contending
with substantial domestic opposition to its hard-lined policies. Although Home initially
refused the request for British silence,108 by December he had softened his position and
promised that the UK ‘could keep quiet’.109 The extent of this undertaking should not be
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underestimated; Macmillan’s government was under renewed pressure from within the
495Conservative Party to prevent Operation Grandslam entirely. On 12 December, the pro-
Katanga Sir Tufton Beamish passed a motion in the House of Commons urging his
government to block the use of ONUC military force or economic coercion in ‘any part of
the Congo.’ The Parliamentary Office feared that the strength of support for the motion
amongst Conservative backbenchers would mean it would have to be debated.110
500However, Macmillan’s decision to stand aside circumvented this and helped maintain
the British silence that had become important to the Americans. Parliamentary members
were informed that the Government could not find time to debate the matter before the
Recess111 and by the time Parliament returned the decisive moves against Katanga’s
secession had already taken place.112
505During Operation Morthor, the Foreign Office had contemplated withdrawing from
the Congo crisis entirely113 and in December 1962 this idea was contemplated again.
Patrick Dean, British Representative to the UN admitted to Macmillan that he was
becoming increasingly attracted to the idea of removing Britain from the crisis ‘so far
as we possibly can’. The rationale was clear. Were the British to become involved in
510negotiations and then have to either make reservations or to hold back, they would be
blamed in the event that the UN reconciliation plan failed.114 Yet such suggestions of
voluntary withdrawal of British officials from the Congo were largely expressions of
frustration and wishful thinking. British colonial responsibilities in Southern Rhodesia
and Kenya needed tending, too,115 and although British officials could not play as active
515a role as before the Operation Grandslam, Macmillan’s decision to stand aside ultimately
enabled the Foreign Office to continue gathering information from within the Congo
and to provide important assistance and advice from the side-lines. This, in turn,
preserved residual British influence and offered opportunities for continued Anglo-
American cooperation in the Congo.
520Continuing Anglo-American cooperation in the congo
Common wisdom maintains that with heated exchanges at the Nassau summit and
British stand aside at the UN over Operation Grandslam, Anglo-American relations in the
Congo reached a nadir. This would suggest reciprocal resentment and a breakdown in
Anglo-American coordination and cooperation. Yet detailed analysis of events beyond
5251962 does not support such dire conclusions.
For a start, it is evident that the US continued to value British residual influence in the
Congo. A good example of this is how the US worked to ensure that the British were
able to maintain diplomatic representation within Katanga. Prime Minister Adoula and
other leading Congolese parliamentarians were frustrated by British dealings with
530Tshombé and resented what they perceived to be Britain’s interference in the Congo’s
internal affairs.116 These sentiments were sufficiently strong that the American Embassy
in Leopoldville feared a breach of Anglo-Congolese relations at the beginning of
January 1963. The American ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion, interjected
on behalf of the British in an attempt to head off this possibility. In a conversation with
535Congolese Foreign Minister Bomboko on 2 January, the Ambassador set out Britain’s
continued importance in Katanga. First, the UK’s wider responsibilities in Africa meant it
would be important in helping the Congolese government negotiate with countries
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such as Rhodesia. Second, the Congolese had ‘good friends’ among the British people,
press and parliament. To break relations with Britain would alienate these important
540sources of support for the new country, including within the Labour Party that might at
some point come into power. Gullion also emphasised the risks to the Congolese
government’s relations with the wider western world of breaking diplomatic relations
with the British, especially were this done whilst maintaining relations with the USSR and
an impression thereby be created that the Congo was moving towards the Soviet orbit.
545In particular, this eventuality would play badly in influential US political circles and likely
have negative consequences for future US–Congolese relations.117
The Congolese leadership listened but its frustration with Britain was such that at this
point it was convinced neither by the US Ambassador nor by British attempts to
ameliorate Anglo-Congolese relations—including an offer of two million pounds in
550economic aid.118 Caught between American pressure and a majority in the Congolese
Cabinet favouring a break of diplomatic relations with Britain, Foreign Minister Bomboko
elected to expel at 24 hours’ notice Derek Dodson of the British Consulate—the
individual most associated with Tshombé’s return—rather than the entire British
Consulate in Elisabethville. Dodson was to leave on 10 January, the same day that
555news of Tshombé’s return to Elisabethville reached Adoula’s government.119 The
Americans now faced a telling choice. They could accept this decision and potentially
thereby consolidate relations with Adoula or they could risk their political standing with
the Congolese government to press for a reconsideration of Dodson’s expulsion. The
Kennedy administration immediately pursued the latter option, with the State
560Department and the American Embassy in Leopoldville flying into mediation mode. A
member of the American Consul in Elisabethville, Jonathan Dean, sent a telegram to
Secretary of State Dean Rusk explaining that the Congolese government was ignorant of
the fact that Dodson had given full support to the Congo’s integration and that he ‘had
personally seen him repeatedly argue sincerely and forcefully with Tshombé. . .for com-
565mon GOC, US and UK policy.’ He also informed Rusk that it would be damaging to US
interests to lose Dodson ‘both as [an] UK representative and as [an] individual.’120 These
sentiments clearly resonated with those held in Washington for the State Department
sent an immediate response instructing the US Embassy to ‘assert all possible influence,
short of endangering your own position’ to achieve a reversal in the Congolese govern-
570ment’s decision.121
Ambassador Edmund Gullion duly met with Adoula and Robert Gardiner, Sture
Linner’s replacement as the UN Officer responsible for the Congo, to urge moderation.
This meeting risked angering Adoula and damaging US–Congo relations were the
Congolese Prime Minister to perceive the interjection as American valuing of British
575interests in the region above securing the country’s political stability. Nevertheless,
Gullion argued that Dodson could ‘save the destruction of lives and property’ in
Katanga and that Congolese public opinion might be assuaged were the government
to announce that it had received British explanations for their policy in Katanga.122
During the meeting, Adoula was non-committal but Gullion was evidently hopeful of a
580positive outcome, describing the Congolese Prime Minister as having appeared ‘inter-
ested’ in his argument.123 Adoula subsequently proposed to defer Dodson’s expulsion
on condition that ‘certain things had to be done.’124 What he meant by this is unclear
but in any case events took over. By 14 January, Tshombé had allowed the UN freedom
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of movement in Katanga and legally ended the secession, thereby releasing much of the
585parliamentary pressure upon Adoula. Dodson’s expulsion was forgotten but the British
remained appreciative of the American role. As was noted in a Foreign Office memor-
andum, ‘it appears that. . .Mr. Gullion was instructed to weigh in on Mr. Dodson’s behalf
and this may have been an element in persuading the Congolese Government to relax
[their] pressure.’125
590American investment in helping preserve British representation in the Congo paid
dividends as the UK and US cooperated in the ending of the secession of Katanga.
Operation Grandslam had caused Tshombé to abscond to Northern Rhodesia and to
incite a ‘scorched earth’ policy, which called upon the Katangese to resist ONUC
forces by ‘all means including spears and poisoned arrows.’126 He publicly blamed a
595fear for his personal safety as the predominant motive for fleeing127 but as Tshombé’s
gendarmerie was facing military defeat in Katanga it is reasonable to suspect the
decision was at least partially tactical; an attempt to complicate the culmination of
the ONUC operation by refusing to accept legally the end of Katanga’s secession. The
forecasted consequences of Tshombé’s continued absence were troubling for the US
600and UK. First, Tshombé was considered to be the only leader capable of preventing
clashes between tribal groups within Katanga that were united only in their steadfast
opposition against the UN, European states and institutions such as the UMHK.128
Second, a breakdown in political stability within Katanga threatened to initiate a
general exodus of Europeans from the Congo, which would have serious economic
605and political repercussions for both the British and Belgian governments. Such an
exodus would undermine, too, UMHK operations, with negative consequences for the
Congolese Treasury, regional economic stability and diplomatic relations with
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Third, Tshombé’s absence would force the UN to assume
an administrative role in order to ensure Katanga’s continued stability, a role for
610which it was ill-equipped.129 Foreign Office and State Department officials were
therefore agreed that once the ONUC operation was finished Tshombé must be
encouraged to return to Katanga to help manage and legitimise the end of the
Katangese secession.130
The Americans however were in a difficult position vis-a-vis Tshombé and Katanga.
615The Katangese generally perceived the US to have supported Operation Grandslam and
the consequent threat to Tshombé’s safety. The Kennedy administration thus had
limited capacity to exert pressure on Tshombé. At the same time, American desire to
court African nationalist groups, coupled with rising sensitivity to race relations within
the US and mounting public resentment in the Congo at what was perceived to be
620continued European meddling in their internal affairs, meant that US policymakers
preferred not to be identified with Tshombé’s return.131 The Kennedy administration
consequently turned to the British and the Belgians to take the lead in achieving a
mutually desired end. Macmillan’s government was well placed to assist. Tshombé had
sought safety within a British protectorate, meaning the UK had diplomatic leverage
625over him through the British Consulate in Elisabethville and through the use of both
individuals such as Welensky and through shareholders of Tanganyika Concessions. The
trick, though, given the political pressures facing the Conservative government over the
Congo, was to assist the Americans without being seen to take a lead position. The
solution developed by the Foreign Office was to exercise influence but place the
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630‘Belgians in the front line’ so that Macmillan’s government avoided actions which ‘would
be unacceptable to public opinion’ in the UK.132
Joint US-UK messages were sent to Tshombé through British government officials in
Rhodesia, the Belgian consulate and through the UMHK. One such message, drafted by
Home and Rusk, warned Tshombé that failure to return to Elisabethville would provide
635the Russians with an opportunity to enter into the Congo. The Katangese leader was
urged ‘most earnestly to return without delay.’133 Once he did so, the covert messages
continued. On 4 January, a Foreign Office message assured Dean Rusk that there had
been constant communication with Tshombé. The UK High Commissioner in Salisbury
‘in some "mysterious” way’ relayed messages by radio to the Katangese leader.134
640Another route was explained on 5 January by Jonathan Dean. American messages to
Tshombé could be passed through the UMHK Director Urbain. Responses would then
pass through Joachim Frenkiel, the Rector of Elisabethville University, to the British
Consulate in Elisabethville who in turn would pass the messages to the Americans.135
Diplomatic messages alone however would not guarantee the end of Katanga’s
645secession. When on 30 December Tshombé acceded to persistent British pressure
and agreed to return to Elisabethville, he did so on the condition that the UN would
guarantee his personal safety and that of his ministers.136 This assurance was not
easily secured given that U Thant resolutely refused to negotiate with Tshombé
unless he surrendered his ‘scorched earth’ policy.137 The UK and US again coordi-
650nated their responses, dividing tasks according to where their influence was the
greatest. While the British continued to press Tshombé to end the secession, the
Americans focused their attention on the UN, urging members to support assurance
of Tshombé’s safe return.138 This was achieved on 31 December, when U Thant
relented. He pledged that Tshombé’s safety could be assured if he returned to
655Elisabethville and took the necessary steps towards integration within a two week
timeframe.139 On 3 January, after ONOC forces seized Jadotville, the Foreign Office
informed Rusk that Tshombé, with ‘few bargaining points left’, appeared more
amenable to cooperation.140 Although there were ‘no categorical assurances’ that
Tshombé was prepared to cooperate with UN demands, the Foreign Office believed
660he was ‘more thoroughly scared than he has ever been and can be pressured to do
so.’141 With UN permission, Belgian plans were consequently made to transport
Tshombé to Elisabethville via a sanctuary in Kolwezi.142 Though continued UN
military movement into Jadotville and Kolwezi-integral mining regions in Katanga
prolonged the reconciliation process and meant that Tshombé did not formally
665renounce the end of Katanga’s secession until 14 January,143 by then the US and
UK had already achieved their primary objective: Tshombé had returned to Katanga
under UN guarantees for his safety and negotiations were enabled.
The end of Katanga’s secession did not resolve all of the Congo’s problems and as
such there were further opportunities for Anglo-American cooperation. By 1964 the
670political situation in the country was again turbulent. The Conseil National de Liberation
(CNL), an increasingly powerful opposition party that had strong Chinese Communist
affiliations, gained control of a large portion of the Province of Kwilu.144 The ONUC,
scheduled to withdraw in June that year, had established a Belgian training programme
to strengthen the Armée National Congolaise (ANC) before their departure. The pro-
675gramme had proven inadequate145 and the ANC was consequently unprepared to fill
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important leadership roles once the ONUC departed. Closely following the UN’s with-
drawal in June, Adoula’s weak leadership also ended when Tshombé returned to the
Congo from his exile in Spain.146 On 9 July 1964, he was granted power by Kasavubu to
form a new provisional government with himself as Prime Minister.147 A weak central
680government and the absence of the UN military presence provided the CNL with the
opportunity it needed to fill prevailing power vacuums. On 5 August, CNL soldiers seized
control of Stanleyville, capital of the Orientale Province, and refused to allow approxi-
mately 1000 non-Congolese citizens—the majority of whom were of American and
European origin—to leave the city.148
685British Prime Minister Wilson’s facilitation of the US President Johnson administra-
tion’s policies during this hostage crisis speaks to the intimacy of the Anglo-American
special relationship. Prior to the crisis, Johnson’s administration had developed strong
reservations about America’s continued presence in the Congo. His predecessor had
incurred substantial domestic and international criticism for the American role in
690Operation Grandslam and for support of Adoula’s government.149 In August 1964, the
State Department concluded that it was time the US ‘pulled their horns’ from the
Congo.150 Within this context and upon hearing news of the hostage crisis, the new
American Ambassador to the Congo, George Mc Murtie Godley, outlined three possible
US options. The first was to convince the Belgians to intervene militarily. Second, if the
695Belgians refused, the State Department might urge Tshombé to recruit a mercenary
brigade. Finally, and only in the ‘most extreme conditions’, the US should be prepared to
intervene militarily.151
The British were helpful initially in enabling American material support of Tshombé. In
August 1964 the Americans used Ascension Island as a base to stage United States Air
700Force (USAF) aircraft tasked with delivering material to the Congo in support of
Tshombé. Though this was not the first time they had used the British island, in
September the Americans realised they had been using it on this occasion without a
formal agreement; the existing Anglo-American arrangement provided for the use of
Ascension only for rocket tracking.152 The Foreign Office, previously unaware that
705American assistance flights to the Congo had been taking place from the island, was
thus surprised to receive an apology for the American oversight. The reaction that
Johnson’s administration received, however, differed significantly from what might be
expected between two sovereign states in these circumstances. Wilson’s government
was supportive. It advised that it ‘did not consider any formal exchange of letters was
710required’153 and the Americans were subsequently allowed continued access to the
island through until November.
The second stage of Anglo-American cooperation came as the hostage crisis
intensified. By November 1964, a Belgian refusal to intervene militarily coupled
with an insubstantial Congolese mercenary force meant that the hostages faced an
715‘imminent danger’.154 Wilson’s government was invited by the Belgians and the
Americans to participate in contingency planning of Operation Dragon Rouge, a
joint American-Belgian paratrooper mission to rescue the hostages. The Belgians
and Americans also asked Britain in November 1964 to provide two battalions of
paratroopers which were to be supported by 27 medium-range and nine long-range
720aircrafts. The British declined participation in the planning155 but agreed to stage the
operation and Belgian troops through Ascension, this despite acknowledging that
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were their role to be exposed the government would likely incur strong African and
domestic criticism. Previous limitations in the use of Ascension to the provision of
‘material assistance’ were avoided by categorising the action as being ‘purely huma-
725nitarian’ and ‘in no way intended as interference in Congolese politics.’156 The British
also met a request by US Under Secretary of State, George Ball, to safeguard the
Operation from leaks by initiating a complete blackout of communication to and
from Ascension whilst the paratroopers were moved to a new location.157 This was
no easy task for the Wilson government. It had no legal power to impose the
730information censorship that the US and Belgians desperately required.158
Nevertheless, it successfully delayed outgoing messages from Ascension and stalled
media speculation until the Operation was successfully completed.159
Conclusion
The Congo crisis demonstrates the complex process for Western countries of removing
735colonial control in favour of indigenous government whilst also seeking to protect
vested interests, safeguard Cold War considerations and uphold as best possible the
rights and obligations of democratic governance in successor Developing Countries. It
also shows that whilst broad conclusions can be drawn about the history and practice of
decolonisation, the potential variables are of such magnitude that individual cases can
740only be understood fully through detailed archival reconstruction. In terms of the Congo
crisis and Anglo-American relations, it was an undoubtedly complicated issue but claims
of a breakdown in UK–US coordination and of long-term damage to the special relation-
ship overstate the case. They also preference narratives of decline in British power and of
the special relationship by underplaying the importance accorded by London and
745Washington to UK–US cooperation before Macmillan’s ‘stand aside’ and by neglecting
their continuing collaboration afterwards in the Congo.
A better way to appreciate the Congo crisis in terms of Anglo-American relations,
therefore, is to view it through a lens of overlapping but not identical frames. For the US
in the Congo, as often happened elsewhere as the�developing world was decolonised,
750there was an uncomfortable juxtaposition of traditional anti-colonialism, the colonial
interests of one or more American allies at stake, and a tendency in the higher reaches
of American administrations especially to superimpose upon complex indigenous events
a Cold War dynamic. The ideal ‘solution’ from the perspective of the White House was
for the peaceful emergence of an independent Congo headed by a government broadly
755sympathetic to Western interests and respectful of established overseas economic
interests. Whitehall could gladly accept the same solution but in arriving at that point
primary British considerations and options were different. The Macmillan government
had vested British economic interests to protect, domestic political constraints to
manage, and a raft of wider considerations to balance, including Britain’s responsibilities
760in Africa and its own de-colonisation process, Anglo-American relations and anti-
communism—however exaggerated British officials sometimes felt such threats to be
by the Americans.
Establishing these overlapping but non-identical frames reveals how constrained the
British government’s freedom of manoeuvre was in meeting US concerns and why
765Macmillan’s ‘stand aside’ during the December 1962 ONUC Operation Grandslam was
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actually a shrewd decision. It protected his Conservative Party leadership and govern-
ment by distancing Britain from the UN mission and removed both an important irritant
in UK-US relations and an obstacle to the ONUC’s entry into Katanga. It also preserved a
measure of British influence within Katanga and with Tshombé, which was important in
770the eventual reintegration of Katanga, and avoided Britain withdrawing from the crisis
entirely. The latter would have neglected its African colonial responsibilities, under-
mined British economic interests in Katanga and prevented the Anglo-American coop-
eration in the Congo that subsequently continued.
Finally it is evident that throughout the Congo crisis London and Washington
775valued, and made concessions to preserve, their collaboration. In December 1961
Kennedy helped arrange a ceasefire in the Congo to ease Macmillan’s concerns that
his government might fall as a result of a vote of no confidence in Parliament.
Similarly, the Kennedy administration’s scramble in January 1963 to prevent the
expulsion of Derek Dodson of the British consul from Elisabethville demonstrates
780that the Americans were willing to take calculated political risks with the Congolese
government to ensure the British remained. Conversely Prime Minister Wilson’s assis-
tance in the Johnson administration’s handling of the Stanleyville hostage crisis in
1964 confirms that Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo owed to more than the
close personal relationship between Kennedy and Macmillan. In fact, the informality
785with which American use of Ascension Island was agreed in August 1964 was in many
respects reminiscent of the remarkable nature of American use of military bases in
Britain itself.
Notes
1. Cf Dumbrell, A Special Relationship; Dobson, Anglo-American Relations and Reynolds and
790Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart.
2. For a collection of perspectives on this speech see Butler and Stockwell, eds. The Wind of Change.
3. Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role; and Middeke, "Anglo-American Nuclear
Weapons Cooperation,” 69–96.
4. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War.
7955. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis,195.
6. Kent, "Anglo-American Diplomacy: The not so Special Relationship,” 133.
7. James, "Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis,” 152.
8. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 34; Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 8; and Olaopa and
Ojakorotu, "Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 247.
8009. Olaopa and Ojakorotu, "Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 247.
10. Othen, Katanga 1960–1963, 27.
11. Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 9.
12. Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 10; Othen, Katanga 1960–1963, 27; and Dwight D.
Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDE), Robinson McIlvaine, 7 July, 1978, Oral History, 23.
80513. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 17; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 46.
14. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 59.
15. James, "Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis,” 154.
16. Olaopa and Ojakorotu, "Prospect of Development in the Democratic Republic of Congo,”
247; Gijs, "Fighting the red peril in the Congo,” 283; and Kent, Cold War conflict in the Congo.
81017. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 64; and De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, 6.
18 S. MARSH AND T. CULLEY
18. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJ), National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo,
Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by Department of State,
27 January 1961, 4.
19. DDE, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records 1952–1961, International
815Series, Box 3, Congo (1), Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 9 July 1960.
20. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJ), National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo,
Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by Department of State,
27 January 1961, 4–6.
21. Ibid., 6–7.
82022. For an introduction to indigenous Katangese leaders see Larmer and Kennes, "Rethinking
the Katangese Secession,” 741–761.
23. UK National Archives (UKNA), FO 371/176725, G. E Millard to Sir Roderick Barclay,
27 February 1964; Kent, "Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the
Congo,” 96–97.
82524. Kent, "Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo,” 96.
25. UKNA, FO 371/146659, JB 1019/8, ‘Recognition of Katanga as independent’ comment by
Belgian PM, memo by African Department, 13 July 1960.
26. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 66.
27. In the early 1960s, seventeen African countries were preparing for independence and subse-
830quently, both Washington and Moscow were reviewing their African policies. Namikas explains
that in the rawest form, both superpowers, wanting as many allies as possible were prepared
to secure the allegiances of any newly independent African state. Namikas, 47; DDE, White
House Office Files, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 28, NSC 6001, Africa, South, Central
and East, ‘US Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa’ 19 January 1960.
83528. For an indication of the Eisenhower administration’s interest in Catholicism as a bulwark
against communism in the Congo see DDE, Dulles, Eleanor Lansing: Papers 1880–1973,
Box 33, Africa Trip Oct. 1960—Jan. 1961 (6), handwritten note. For a scholarly consideration
of religion and anti-communism see Kirby, Religion and the Cold War.
29. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of
840the Congo Crisis’ report by the Department of State, 27 January 1961, 9–10.
30. Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 38; and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 68.
31. UKNA, FO 371/146644, ‘The Situation in the Congo’, memo by African Department,
14 September 1960; UKNA, FO 371/154964, ‘Washington Talking Points: Congo’, brief by
the Foreign Office, 20 March 1961.
84532. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 72; LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo
Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis’ report by the Department of State,
27 January 1961, 8.
33. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa, Congo Box 86, ‘An Analytical Chronology of
the Congo Crisis’ report by the Department of State, 27 January 1961, 9.
85034. DDE, White House Office Files, NSC Series, Policy Paper Subseries, Box 28, NSC 6001, Africa,
South, Central and East, ‘Statement of US Policy Toward South, Central and East Africa,
19 January 1960, 1.
35. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa- Congo Box 86 ‘An Analytical Chronology of
the Congo Crisis’ report by Department of State 27 January 1961,18–21.
85536. UKNA, FO 371/146769, Brief by the Foreign Office, 14 July 1960.
37. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 43.
38. See footnote four in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Telegram from the Embassy
in the Congo to the Department of State, 18 July 1961, [online] available from. https://history.
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v14/d132 (accessed March 9, 2017).
86039. Ibid.
40. Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 25.
41. FRUS, Memorandum of Discussion at the 452d Meeting of the National Security Council,
21 July 1960, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-
60v14/d140 (accessed November 20, 2017).
CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 19
86542. FRUS, Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State,
26 August 1960, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1958-60v14/d190> (accessed October 29, 2016).
43. Kent, "Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold War to the Congo,” 108.
44. DDE, US National Security Council Records Presidential Records, Intelligence Files 1953-61,
870Box 1, Minutes of Special Group Meetings, Minutes of Special Group Meeting,
10 November 1960.
45. DDE, Papers as President, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, NSC Series Box 13, 456th
Meeting of the NSC 18 August 1960.
46. John F Kennedy Presidential Library (JFK), National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo
875General 1/61-4/61, Suggested New United States Policy for the Congo, Dean Rusk,
Memorandum to the President, 1 February 1961.
47. Lefever, United National Peacekeeping in the Congo 1960–1964, 22–23.
48. DDE, White House Office Files, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 14, Intelligence Briefing Notes,
Vol II (7), Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President,
88015 December 1960.
49. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 123.
50. Ibid., 121.
51. JFK, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General 1/61-4/61, Suggested New
United States Policy for the Congo, Dean Rusk, Memorandum to the President,
8851 February 1961.
52. De Witte, Assassination of Lumumba, 118; Gerard and Kuklick, Death in the Congo, 200–205;
and Namikas, Battleground Africa, 125.
53. Currently, there is no consensus as to when Kennedy was informed of Lumumba’s death.
Lumumba’s return to power continued to be debated within Kennedy’s administration into mid-
890January 1961. First reports indicating suspicionsof Lumumba’s death emergedon17 January 1961
but the official announcement of Lumumba’s death was made on 13 February. FRUS Special
National Intelligence Estimate, 10 January 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d2> (accessed November 27, 2016); Ibid., Editorial Note,
[online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d6>
895(accessed November 27, 2016); JFK, National Security Files, Box 27 A, Countries, Congo General,
1/61-4/61, Statement by US Representative in Security Council, 13 February 1961.
54. See note 51 above.
55. The Analytical Chronology Report perhaps best demonstrates that the Kennedy adminis-
tration’s focus on the ‘Katanga Issue’ was initiated in August 1961 after ‘Efforts to Achieve
900Unity: March 1961-July 1961’, JFK, National Security Files, Box 28, Countries, Congo General,
"Congo Chronology,” 25–32.
56. At the July 1961 Lovanium gathering, where the Congolese leaders gathered to elect a new
government, the CIA reportedly spent $23 000 in order to strengthen Adoula’s position
during the closed meetings. FRUS, Editorial Note, Volume XX, Congo crisis, Document 71
905[online] available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d71>
(accessed October 20, 2016); Ibid., Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the
Department of State, 28 April 1961, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/histor
icaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d62 (accessed March 9, 2017). For an indication of Adoula’s
political opposition to Lumumba see Devlin, Chief of Station, Congo, 70.
91057. Ibid., Editorial Note, 20–21 February 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d34> (accessed November 28, 2016).
58. Ibid, Editorial Note, 28 August 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/histor
icaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d100> (accessed February 20, 2017).
59. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 149–151.
91560. In Operation Rumpunch, ONUC forces seized the headquarters of the gendarmerie, the radio
station and other communications buildings in Elisabethville. On the same day Tshombé
agreed to cooperate with the ONUC’s withdrawal request and the operation was halted.
Hammarskjöld approved Operation Morthor after the arrival of new mercenary forces in
20 S. MARSH AND T. CULLEY
Katanga. ONUC forces seized control of outposts in Elisabethville and made moves to arrest
920Tshombé but Rhodesian intervention precluded this. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 150–151; for
Belgian and British reactions see footnotes in FRUS, Telegram from the Department of State to
the Embassy in Belgium, 15 September 1961, [online] available from <https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d111> (accessed March 8, 2017).
61. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 153; FRUS, Editorial Note, 116 [online] available from https://
925history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d116 (accessed November 29, 2017).
62. UKNA, CAB 130/178, Minutes of a meeting held at Admiralty House, The Congo,
12 September 1961.
63. United States National Archives (USNA), RG 59, Conference Files, Box 273, CF 2023- Bermuda
Meeting with Macmillan, folder 2 of 2, Outgoing Telegram from the Department of State,
93028 December 1961.
64. Ibid, CF 2025- Bermuda Meeting with Macmillan, Briefing Book, Congo: US.-UK. Differences,
18 December 1961.
65. JFK, Personal Papers of Harlan Cleveland, Box 68, Congo General, 2/61-10/61, United States
Policy in the Congo Report, 21 September 1961, 5.
93566. JFK, National Security Files, Box 27A, Countries, Congo General 5/61-9/61, Memorandum for
the President, report by Dean Rusk, 3 August 1961.
67. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 156.
68. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 28, Congo General 12/21/61-12/31/61, Outgoing
Telegram, Department of State, 29 December 1961; FRUS, Telegram from the Department of
940State to the Embassy in the Congo, 26 December 1961, [online] available from <https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d181> (accessed February 20, 2017).
69. Recognising that Adoula and Tshombé were unlikely to come to an agreement through
negotiations alone, Director of the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hilsman
sent a report suggesting policy alternatives to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk in March 1961.
945The report recommended ‘strong external pressures on both parties.’ JFK, National Security
Files, Box 28, Countries, Congo-General 3/10/62-4/30/62, Policy Alternatives in the Congo,
report by Roger Hilsman, 29 March 1962.
70. U Thant was appointed Acting Secretary General on 3 November 1961. See for instance,
footnote two in FRUS, Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy,
95011 November 1961, [online] available from https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1961-63v20/d140 (accessed November 29, 2017). For George Ball’s thoughts on the
Congo, see JFK, National Security Files, Box 31, Countries, Congo Cables 7/16/62-7/23/62,
Telegram from the Department of State, 21 July 1962.
71. Ibid., Box 28 A, Countries, Congo-General 8/3/62-8/10/62, Proposal for National
955Reconciliation, National Security Action Memorandum, 2 August 1962.
72. FRUS, Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to
the Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (Fredericks), 6 August 1962, [online]
available from <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d269>
(accessed February 20, 2017).
96073. The National Reconciliation Plan was also referred to informally as the ‘U Thant Plan’, the
‘conciliation plan’ and the ‘plan’. FRUS, Memorandum for the Department of State Executive
Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy),
11 August 1962, [online] available from http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1961-63v20/d274 (accessed February 20, 2017).
96574. Although the plan was generally supported by the French, Belgian and British governments,
political participation varied significantly. The French refused to participate, the British
refused to participate after phase two and the Belgians refused to participate after stage
three. JFK, National Security Files, Box 28 A Countries, Congo General 8/11/61-8/27/62,
Current Status of Proposed Action on the Congo, Department of State Memorandum for
970Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 11 August 1962.
75. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 164.
CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 21
76. JFK, National Security Files, Box 32, Countries, Congo Cables 9/24/62-9/30/62, Telegram
from New York to the Secretary of State, 25 September 1962.
77. USNA, RG59, Conference Files, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan Nassau Meeting,
975Memcons, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Congo, 19 December 1962.
78. For information on the British decision to stand aside, see Ibid., 21 December 1962. For
information on Operation Glandslam see, FRUS, Memorandum from the Department of
State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Kaysen), 28 December 1962,[online] available from < https://history.state.
980gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d387> (accessed February 20, 2017).
79. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174; FRUS, Telegram from the Department of State to the
Embassy in the Congo, 14 January 1963, [online] available from http://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d411 (accessed February 20, 2017).
80. JFK, National Security Files, Box 28 A, Countries, Congo General 14/12/62-17/12/62, Congo
985Scenario, n.d.
81. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 109; James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 195;
and O’Malley, "Anglo-American-UN relations during the Congo Crisis,” 40.
82. UKNA, CAB 130/178, ‘The Congo’, Cabinet Report, 12 September 1961.
83. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate, 124.
99084. James, "Britain, the Cold War and the Congo Crisis,” 154.
85. UKNA, FO 371/146640, ‘British Business Interests in the Katanga’, report by E.B. Boothby,
20 July 1960.
86. Passemiers, "Safeguarding White Minority Power,” 70–91.
87. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War, 112.
99588. UKNA, FO 371/154954, Letter from Sir Roy Welensky to Lord Home, West and Central African
Department, 21 April 1961.
89. Oxford Bodleian Libraries, MSS. Macmillan dep, substitute for MS. Macmillan dep, d 46,
5 August 1962; Harold Macmillan diary note, 5 August 1962, cited in, Horne, Harold
Macmillan, 405.
100090. Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation, 113; and Williams, Who Killed Hammarskold?
135–139.
91. For correspondence between Welensky and Home, see Welensky, Welensky’s 4000 Days,
209–240; and Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonisation, 114–115.
92. James, Britain and the Congo Crisis, 140.
100593. UKNA, FO 371/155007, Bombs for the UN in the Congo, FO Minute by K.M Wilford,
9 November 1961; PREM 11/3168, Telegram from UK Delegation to the UN,
12 December 1961.
94. Ibid., Meeting of Ministers to consider further the supply of bombs to the United Nations,
Foreign Office note to Mr. Stevens, 7 December 1961.
101095. UKNA, CAB 128/35, Conclusions of a Cabinet Meeting, 11 December 1961.
96. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa, 116; and O’Malley, "What an awful body the UN have
become!!,” 37.
97. Oxford Bodleian Libraries, MS. Macmillan dep. c. 943, extract from H.M’s letter to the Queen,
13 December 1961.
101598. JFK, Oral History Program, Lord Harlech recorded interview by Richard Neustadt,
12 March 1965, 36–37.
99. See JFK, The Personal Papers of George W Ball, Box 2 of 9, Congo 12/5/61-12/22/61, Telecon:
Bundy/Ball, 13 December 1962; Ibid., telecon, Gov. Stevenson/Ball, 13 December 1962; Ibid.,
Oral History Program, Lord Harlech, recorded interview by Richard Neustadt, 12 March 1965, 37.
1020100. UKNA, FO 371/161491, Brief for the Cabinet Meeting on 11 December, F.O Minute by G.E,
Millard, 10 December 1962.
101. UKNA, FO 371/161485, Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Dean
Rusk at the American Embassy in Paris, 11 December 1962.
102. JFK, President’s Weekend Reading, Box 5, Weekend Reading, 26 May 1962.
22 S. MARSH AND T. CULLEY
1025103. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 30 A, Congo Cables 5/14/62-5/19/62, Telegram
from London to Secretary of State, 16 May 1962.
104. Ibid., Box 28 A, Congo General 12/14/62-12/17/62, Report of Conversation with Secretary
General U Thant on the Congo, memorandum from Harlan Cleveland, 16 December 1962.
105. UKNA, PREM 11/3630, ‘Congo’ memorandum by Michael Cary, 10 December 1962.
1030106. UKNA, FO 371/167244, ‘Secret and Personal’ Derek Riches to Sir Roger Stevens,
28 December 1962.
107. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 32, Congo Cables 9/24/62-9/30/62, Telegram to
from New York to Secretary of State, 24 September 1962.
108. FRUS, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State,
103525 September 1962 [online] available from http://state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-
63v20/d295 (accessed February 2, 2017).
109. USNA, RG 59 Conferences, Box 306, CF 2209-Kennedy, Macmillan, Nassau Meeting,
Dec 19–20, 1962 memcons, The Congo, 21 December 1962.
110. UKNA, FO 371/161491, Resolution urging HMG to refrain from the forcible solution of Congo
1040crisis, motion by Mr. Tufton Beamish, 12 December 1962.
111. Ibid, Statement by the Leader of the House, 13 December 1962.
112. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram London to Secretary of State,
4 January 1963.
113. UKNA, CAB 130/178, Minutes of a meeting, Subject: The Congo, 12 September 1961.
1045114. UKNA, FO 371/161478, Letter to Macmillan from Patrick Dean, 4 December 1962.
115. Ibid., telegram from New York to Foreign Office, 17 December 1962.
116. UKNA, FO 371/167244, UK Aid to the Congo, FO Minute by P. M. Foster, 9 January 1963.
117. JFK, National Security Files, Box 34, Congo cables 1/1/63-1/5/63, Message from Leopoldville
to Secretary of State, 2 January, 1962.
1050118. British Foreign Office officials were informed that the Congo refused to be compared with a
‘small child to whom one gives a piece of sugar to keep it quiet’. UKNA, FO 371/167244,
Telegram from Leopoldville to Foreign Office by Mr. Riches, 9 January 1963.
119. The Belgian Ambassador in Elisabethville was also requested to leave. JFK, National Security
Files, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/6/1963-1/10/1963, Leopoldville to Secretary of State,
105510 January, 1963.
120. Ibid., Telegram Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963.
121. Ibid., Telegram Department of State to American Embassy in Leopoldville, 10 January 1963.
122. Ibid, 1/11/1963-1/20/1963, Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 11 January 1963.
123. Ibid.
1060124. Ibid., Telegram Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 12 January, 1963.
125. UKNA, PREM 11/4084, Secret memorandum to Philip de Zulueta from Tom Bridges,
14 January 1963.
126. USNA, RG 59 Records of the Department of State, Box 1976 B, 770g.00/12-2962–/1-163,
Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 30 December 1962.
1065127. UKNA, FO 371/167244, ‘Congo’ brief for Cabinet Meeting by West and Central African
Department, 2 January 1963.
128. Ibid., ‘Congo’ Brief for the Nassau Conference by G.E. Millard, 14 December 1963‘ USNA, RG 59,
Box 1976 B, 770g.00/1-263–/1-463, Telegram from the Department of State, 3 January 1963.
129. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 28 A, Congo General 1 1 63/1/15/63.
1070130. Ibid, Box 33 A, Congo Cables XV 12/28/62-12/31/62, Outgoing Telegram from the
Department of State, 30 December 1962.
131. For Gullion’s reservations for instance, see USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-263–/1-463,
Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 2 January 1963, for reservations concern-
ing American public opinion, see Ibid., 770.g 00/1-563–/1-863, Telegram from Leopoldville
1075to Secretary of State, 8 January 1963.
132. The policy was first put forward by G.E Millard, head of the Western and Central African
Department in December 1963. He explained that the idea was ‘inglorious’ but ‘good
CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 23
tactics.’ UKNA, FO 371/167244, ‘Congo’ brief for the Nassau conference by G.E. Millard,
14 December 1963.
1080133. The message was meant to be sent to Tshombé through the British High Commissioner in
Rhodesia, Lord Alport but on 4 January the communication route was queried with the
Foreign Office ultimately deciding they preferred ‘to use the Union Minière Channel.’ For
details see, UKNA, FO 371/167244, Message from HMG to Tshombé, 1 January 1963;
Message from Leopoldville to Foreign Office, 4 January 1963; Message from Foreign
1085Office to Elisabethville, 4 January 1963.
134. JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 34, Congo Cables, 1/1/63-1/5/63, Telegram from
London to Secretary of State, January 4 1963.
135. Ibid., Elisabethville to Secretary of State, 5 January 1963.
136. Ibid., Box 33 A, Congo Cables Vol. XV 12/28/62-12/31/62, Telegram Elisabethville to
1090Secretary of State, 30 December 1962.
137. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563–/1-863, Telegram from the Department of State,
8 January 1963.
138. Ibid.
139. Kalb, The Congo Cables, 368; and JFKL, National Security Files, Countries, Box 33 A, Congo
1095Cables Vol. XV, 12/28/62-12/31/62, Outgoing Telegram from the Secretary of State,
31 December 1962.
140. USNA, RG 59, Box 1976 B, 770g. 00/1-563–/1-863, Incoming telegram from London to
Secretary of State, 3 January 1963.
141. Ibid., Incoming telegram from London to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.
1100142. Sobelair, a Belgian company had a commercial airplane in Elisabethville under UN protec-
tion. The UN subsequently permitted the plane to fly to Kolwezi, pick up Tshombé and fly to
Kipushi where Tshombé would then make his way to Elisabethville by road. Ibid, Telegram
from New York (Plimpton) to Secretary of State, 4 January 1963.
143. On 9 January, the UN also moved into Kolwezi- home of two of the province’s key dams and
1105power generators. Tshombé again issued his scorched earth policy and demanded that all
administrative workers refuse to cooperate with the UN. He was consequently placed under
house arrest, from which on 11 January he escaped. On 14 January, Tshombé wrote to
Adoula stating that the Katangese gendarmerie were ‘ready to proclaim immediately before
the whole world that the secession of Katanga is over.’ Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174;
1110JFK, National Security Files, Countries, Box 34, Congo Cables 1/6/63-1/10/63, Telegram
Leopoldville (Gullion) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963; Ibid., Telegram Salisbury
(Geren) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1963; Ibid., Congo Cables 1/11/63-1/20/63,
Telegram from Salisbury to Secretary of State, 14 January 1963.
144. UKNA, FO 371/176683, ‘British Policy in the Congo’ report by G. E. Millard, 25 February 1964.
1115145. Ibid.
146. On 31 May 1963 Tshombé escaped to Spain to avoid house arrest as UN troops brought the
final holdouts in Katanga under control. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 174. For Tshombé’s
return to the Congo, see Ibid., 191.
147. UKNA, FO 371/176653, Telegram from Leopoldville (Mr. Rose) to Foreign Office,
112010 July 1964.
148. Namikas, Battleground Africa, 196–197; and LBJ, National Security Files, Country File Africa-
Congo, Box 81, Congo, Volume 3 8/64 [2 of 2], Telegram from Dar-Es-Salaam to Department
of State, 5 August 1964.
149. UKNA, FO 371/176660, Comments on the American Attitude to the OAU’s Discussing
1125Military Assistance to the Congo, memo by R.J. R. Owen, 9 July 1964.
150. Ibid., Interview with Mr. Looram of the State Department, report by R.J.R Jones,
4 August 1964.
151. LBJ, National Security File, Country File Africa- Congo, Box 81, Congo, Volume 3, 8/64 [2 of 2]
Telegram from Leopoldville to Secretary of State, 5 August 1964.
24 S. MARSH AND T. CULLEY
1130152. The Americans had previously utilised the island in the Second World War and again in
1957. UKNA, CO 968/809, Letter to Sir John Field of Pantation House from R. G. Pettitt,
27 October 1964; Ibid., Letter to Mr. Eastwood from J. D Higham, 25 November 1964.
153. For information on the American letter see, UKNA, CO 968/809, Memo from C.M. Rose to
John Higham in the Colonial Office, 30 September 1964. For British reaction see, Ibid., Letter
1135to C. M. Rose from J. D. Higham, 7 October 1964; Ibid., Letter to J. D. Higham from C. M.
Rose, 13 November 1964.
154. UKNA, FO 371/176746, Telegram from New York to Foreign Office, 22 November 1964.
155. LBJ, National Security Files, Country File Africa-Congo, Box 83, Congo, Volume 6 10/64-11/64
[3 of 4], Telegram from Brussels to Secretary of State, 13 November 1964.
1140156. UKNA, CO 968/809, Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, 21 November.
157. The request was initially sent on 21 November but it was extended until the Operation had
been completed on 24 November. See Ibid., Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State
for the Colonies to Ascension Island (Administrator) 21 November 1964; Ibid.,
22 November 1964; Ibid., 23 November 1964, Ibid., 24 November 1964.
1145158. Ibid, Inward Telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from Ascension Island
(Administrator), 23 November 1964.
159. The telegram notes that the ‘U.S Government are most grateful for the imposition of the
black-out.’ Ibid., Outward Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to
Ascension.
1150Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.AQ3 �
Bibliography
Ashton, N. Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence. Hampshire:
Macmillan, 2002.AQ4 �
1155Butler, L. J., and S. Stockwell, eds. The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization.
Hampshire: Macmillan, 2013.
De Witte, L. The Assassination of Lumumba. London: Verso, 2001.
Devlin, L. Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.
Dimbleby, D., and D. Reynolds. An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the
1160Twentieth Century. New York: Random House, 1988.
Dobson, A. Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise
and Decline of Superpowers. Abingdon: Routledge, 1995.
Dumbrell, J. A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After. Hampshire:
Routledge, 2001.
1165Gerard, E., and B. Kuklick. Death in the Congo: Murdering Patrice Lumumba. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2015.
Gijs, A.-S. "Fighting the Red Peril in the Congo. Paradoxes and Perspectives on an Equivocal
Challenge to Belgium and the West (1947-1960).” Cold War History 16, no. 3 (2016): 273–290.
doi:10.1080/14682745.2016.1163340.
1170Horne, A. Macmillan: The Official Biography. Vol. II. Oxford: Macmillan, 1989.
James, A. Britain and the Congo Crisis 1960:1963. London: Macmillan, 1996.
James, A. "Britain, the Cold War, and the Congo Crisis, 1960–63.” The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History 28, no. 3 (2000): 152–168. doi:10.1080/03086530008583103.
Kalb, M. The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa- from Eisenhower to Kennedy. New York:
1175Macmillan, 1982.
Kent, J. America, the UN and Decolonisation: ColdWar Conflict in the Congo. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.
CONTEMPORARY BRITISH HISTORY 25
Kent, J. "Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Congo Crisis, 1960–63: The Not so Special
Relationship.” Chap. 7 In Britain in Global Politics. Vol. 2, edited by J. Young, E. Pedaliu, and M.
Kandiah, 119–139. Hampshire: Macmillan, 2013.
1180Kent, J. "The Neo-Colonialism of Decolonisation: Katangan Secession and the Bringing of the Cold
War to the Congo.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 45, no. 1 (2017): 93–130.
doi:10.1080/03086534.2016.1262644.
Kirby, D., eds. Religion and the Cold War. Hampshire: Macmillan, 2003.
Larmer, M., and E. Kennes. "Rethinking the Katangese Secession.” The Journal of Imperial and
1185Commonwealth History 42, no. 4 (2014): 741–761. doi:10.1080/03086534.2014.894716.
Lefever, E. Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967.
Lefever, E. United National Peacekeeping in the Congo 1960–1964: An Analysis of Political, Executive
and Military Control. Vol. 1: Summary and Conclusions- report prepared for the US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, 30 June 1966.
1190Mahoney, R. JFK: Ordeal in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Middeke, M. "Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons Cooperation after the Nassau Conference: The
British Policy of Interdependence.” Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (2000): 69–96.
doi:10.1162/15203970051032318.
Murphy, P. Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in
1195Tropical Africa, 1951–1964. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995.
Namikas, L. Battleground Africa: Cold War in the Congo 1960–1965. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2013.
O’Malley, A. "What an Awful Body the UN Have become!!’Anglo-American-UN Relations during the
Congo Crisis, February-December 1961.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 14, no. 1 (2016): 26–46.
1200doi:10.1080/14794012.2015.1125164.
Olaopa, O., and V. Ojakorotu. "Conflict about Natural Resources and the Prospect of Development
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).” Journal of Social Sciences 49, no. 3 (2016): 244–256.
doi:10.1080/09718923.2016.11893618.
Othen, C. Katanga 1960–1963: Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that Waged War on the
1205World. Gloucestershire: History Press, 2015.
Passemiers, L. "Safeguarding White Minority Power: The South African Government and the
Secession of Katanga, 1960-1963.” South African Historical Journal 68, no. 1 (2016): 70–91.
doi:10.1080/02582473.2015.1118882.
Stoddart, K. Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons,
12101964–70. New York: Macmillan, 2012.
Weissman, S. American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964. New York: Cornell University Press, 1974.
Welensky, R. Welensky’s 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
London: Collins, 1964.
Williams, S. Who Killed Hammarskjöld? the UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa. London:
1215C. Hurst, 2011.
26 S. MARSH AND T. CULLEY
